



The Impact of Turkey`s Membership on the EU – Power, Money and External Relations

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Outline

- The Decision in December 2004
- Money
- Power
- Public opinion
- Geopolitics
- Mutual interests, costs and benefits
- Conclusion

The Decision in December 2004

- No automatism to full membership
- Cyprus as the major obstacle
- Euphemism “Negotiations”
- Parallel process:
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
with “Everything but Institutions”
(= Privileged Partnership)
but little financial incentives

Money

- Cap 1: Absorption rate of 4 % of the national GDP in receiving member states
- Cap 2: Which ceiling of EU budget ?
(1,24 / 1,18 / 1 % ?)
- Timing: Current debate on 2007-2013 financial forecast will finish 2006 the latest
- Thus Turkey will not be invited to join before finishing the next 7 years financial plan 2014-2020

Power

- Full-Membership vs Everything but Institutions
- The institutional logic of the EU`s balance of power
- Double-Majority and its consequences for Turkey and the EU

Geopolitics and External Relations

- USA
- Iran
- “Kurdistan” and Iraq
- Armenia
- Caucasus Region
- Ukraine
- Russia
- Moldova
- Middle East

Interests of Turkey

- Full access to the EU single market
- Transfers
- Stability
- Political influence
- Western Identity
- Carot for internal reforms

Which Union?

- Core Europe and concentric circles
- Partial membership and a New Neighborhood Policy (incl. Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean with Israel and Palestine)
- Exceptions and discrimination for new “full” members
- Renationalization in an EU, which becomes the victim of its own success

Fears in the EU

- **Too different:**
Gap between elites and average citizens is reflected in the missing public support for a Turkish full membership
- **Too many:**
Destruction of the existing balances of power between various coalitions (old / new, big / small, rich / poor, south / north, etc.)
- **Too poor:**
Redistribution under the conditions of the existing automatic transfer instruments overstretches EU budget

To be an EU member

- Implementation of EU legislation, norms, standards, regulations
- Acceptance of the single market and its competition policy
- Reconstruction of the agricultural sector
- Establishing Schengen borders
- Fighting corruption and fraud
- Internalizing European thinking

Risks

- Exogenous shocks in the region
- Hypocrisy on both sides
- Social costs (farmers, low skilled workers)
- Cultural changes
- Anti-Reform movements
- Possible decrease of economic development after accession
 - Greece faced economic problems 1980-1995
 - The Irish miracle started 20 years after joining the EC

Some clarifications

- Neither Art. 49 EGV, nor the conclusions of the Council in December 2004 nor any other document promises **full membership** to Turkey
- The Copenhagen criteria are **not fulfilled** yet (but no candidate had to do this before opening negotiations)
- Turkey does not have the option to turn **eastwards** or to get **closer to the USA**. This is not a threat
- The EU does not need Turkey`s membership to get **access to its market**, nor is this the only option to stabilize a region
- Negotiations do not last **10 years**.
This is not a rule, nor do comparisons help in this case

Conclusion

- Regarding widening and deepening a lot has changed recently
- The reunification of the continent is important for both sides as a learning process
- Emotionally and as a matter of pride, an EU membership under all circumstances could make sense – but it would be expensive
- Idealistic positions tend to ignore interests, but interests do matter
 - would Turkey accept Ukraine as EU member?
- The EU in 2015 will be very different



Thank you



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